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1941 
CAN THE PRESIDENT “UNSIGN” A TREATY?  
A CONSTITUTIONAL INQUIRY 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In May 2002, President Bush sparked controversy in the international 
community with his purported “unsigning”1 of the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (ICC), a major multilateral treaty.2 Although 
President Clinton had signed the Rome Statute on December 31, 2000—
the last day in which the treaty remained open for signature—with much 
reservation about its contents,3 and with explicit directions to his 
predecessor not to send the treaty to the Senate for ratification until the 
“significant flaws in the treaty” could be resolved,4 President Bush’s 
decision to unsign the treaty was apparently unprecedented.5 The President 
effected this unsigning through a cursory letter to the United Nations.6  
 
 
 1. Throughout this Note, the term “unsigning” will be used to refer to the procedure by which a 
President attempts to undo or reverse the effects of a prior treaty signature. To date, President Bush’s 
unsigning of the Rome Statute of the ICC is the only national or international example of this 
procedure.  
 2. Neil A. Lewis, U.S. Is Set to Renounce Its Role in Pact for World Tribunal, N.Y. TIMES, May 
5, 2002, at A18. 
 3. See Jean Galbraith, The Bush Administration’s Response to the International Criminal Court, 
21 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 683, 685 (2003); Eric P. Schwartz, The United States and the International 
Criminal Court: The Case for “Dexterous Multilateralism,” 4 CHI. J. INT’L L. 223, 224 (2003); David 
A. Tallman, Note, Catch 98(2): Article 98 Agreements and the Dilemma of Treaty Conflict, 92 GEO. 
L.J. 1033, 1038 (2004). 
 4. Clinton’s Words: ‘The Right Action,’ N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2001, at A6. 
 5. See Cosmos Eubany, Justice for Some? U.S. Efforts Under Article 98 to Escape the 
Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, 27 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 103, 110 n.51 
(2003); Leila Nadya Sadat, An American Vision for Global Justice: Taking the Rule of (International) 
Law Seriously, 4 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 329, 336–37 (2005); Edward T. Swaine, 
Unsigning, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2061, 2064 (2003).  
 6. The letter, signed and delivered by John Bolton, then Under-Secretary of State for Arms 
Control and International Security, reads: 
Dear Mr. Secretary-General: 
 This is to inform you, in connection with the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court adopted on July 17, 1998, that the United States does not intend to become a party to 
the treaty. Accordingly, the United States has no legal obligations arising from its signature 
on December 31, 2000. The United States requests that its intention not to become a party, as 
expressed in this letter, be reflected in the depositary’s status lists relating to this treaty. 
Press Statement, Richard Boucher, U.S. Dep’t of State, International Criminal Court: Letter to U.N. 
Secretary General Kofi Annan (May 6, 2002), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2002/9968.htm (last 
visited Mar. 5, 2006) [hereinafter Letter to U.N.]. 
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The reaction of the international community to this purported 
unsigning has been mixed at best.7 Scholars disagree about the precise 
legal effects, if any, that unsigning a treaty may have.8 Commentators 
have speculated about whether other countries might also attempt to free 
themselves from international obligations by unsigning treaties, and if so, 
what effect such actions would have on international law.9 In general, 
President Bush’s decision has had a profound impact on the international 
community.10 
Beyond the international implications of the decision to withdraw from 
the Rome Statute, President Bush’s decision to unsign a treaty also raises 
serious constitutional questions: Does the Constitution permit a President 
to unsign a treaty? If so, what role, if any, should the Senate or the general 
Congress have in the process? While there has historically been much 
scholarly debate11 and even some judicial consideration12 of the 
 
 
 7. For a discussion of the international reaction to the unsigning, see Swaine, supra note 5, at 
2061–65. 
 8. Compare Michael J. Kelly, Ignoring Criminal Treaty Harms U.S. Legacy, USA TODAY, Apr. 
16, 2002, at 12A, with Curtis A. Bradley, U.S. Announces Intent Not to Ratify International Criminal 
Court Treaty, May 2002, http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh87.htm (last visited Feb. 9, 2007). See also 
Harold Hongju Koh, On American Exceptionalism, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1479, 1508 (2003) (“Under 
international law, it is unclear what the precise legal force of ‘unsigning’ a previously signed treaty 
should be.”).  
 9. See Angela R. Kircher, Attack on the International Criminal Court: A Policy of Impunity, 13 
MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 263, 268 (2005); Swaine, supra note 5, at 2064–65; Steven Mufson & Alan 
Sipress, U.N. Funds in Crossfire over Court, WASH. POST, Aug. 16, 2001, at A1; David J. Scheffer, 
Op-Ed, A Treaty Bush Shouldn’t ‘Unsign’, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2002, at A15.  
 10. See Koh, supra note 8, at 1508–09; Sadat, supra note 5, at 338.  
 11. See generally DAVID GRAY ADLER, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE TERMINATION OF 
TREATIES 84–113 (1986); ROYDEN J. DANGERFIELD, IN DEFENSE OF THE SENATE: A STUDY IN 
TREATY MAKING 1–27 (1933); LOUIS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN CONGRESS AND 
THE PRESIDENT 216–43 (3d ed. 1991); MICHAEL J. GLENNON, CONSTITUTIONAL DIPLOMACY 123–63 
(1990); LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 175–230 (2d ed. 
1996); Arthur Bestor, Respective Roles of Senate and President in the Making and Abrogation of 
Treaties—The Original Intent of the Framers of the Constitution Historically Examined, 55 WASH. L. 
REV. 1 (1979); Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., Goldwater v. Carter: The Constitutional Allocation of 
Power in Treaty Termination, 6 YALE STUD. WORLD PUB. ORD. 81 (1979); Michael J. Glennon, Treaty 
Process Reform: Saving Constitutionalism Without Destroying Diplomacy, 52 U. CINN. L. REV. 84 
(1983); James J. Moriarty, Congressional Claims for Treaty Termination Powers in the Age of the 
Diminished Presidency, 14 CONN. J. INT’L L. 123 (1999); Stefan A. Riesenfeld & Frederick M. Abbott, 
The Scope of U.S. Senate Control over the Conclusion and Operation of Treaties, 67 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 571 (1991); Christopher C. Sabis, Congress and the Treaty Power: An Originalist Argument 
Against Unilateral Presidential Termination of the ABM Treaty, 31 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 223 
(2002); Alan C. Swan, The Constitutional Power to Terminate Treaties: Who, When, and Why, 6 YALE 
STUD. WORLD PUB. ORD. 159 (1979); John Yoo, Politics as Law?: The Antiballistic Missile Treaty, 
the Separation of Powers, and Treaty Interpretation, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 851 (2001) (reviewing 
FRANCIS FITZGERALD, WAY OUT THERE IN THE BLUE: REAGAN, STAR WARS AND THE END OF THE 
COLD WAR (2000)); Guy M. Miller, Note, Treaty Termination Under the United States Constitution: 
Reassessing the Legacy of Goldwater v. Carter, 27 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 859 (1995); Joshua P. 
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presidential and congressional roles in treaty formation and termination, 
there has been practically no discussion of the constitutionality of 
presidential unsigning of a treaty.13 This lack of discussion may result in 
part from Congress’s near-unanimous acceptance of President Bush’s 
unsigning of the Rome Statute—the first and, so far, only example of 
unsigning.14 However, the question of which branch has the power to 
unsign treaties is important for understanding the balance of power in our 
constitutional system. Additionally, the decision to unsign a treaty can 
have serious ramifications for American foreign policy.15  
While the United States does not become formally bound to observe 
the terms of a treaty until the Senate has ratified the treaty, mere treaty 
signature does have important consequences under international law.16 By 
signing a treaty, a nation agrees to refrain from actions that would defeat 
the object and purpose of the treaty.17 Signing a treaty is also an important 
way for the United States and other countries to show commitment to 
common international goals without formally binding themselves to the 
specific terms of a particular undertaking.18  
The United States is currently a signatory to many treaties that the 
Senate has not ratified. Unsigning would enable the President to 
unilaterally escape from the commitments resulting from these treaty 
signatures. Indeed, President Bush’s letter to the U.N. indicated that, by 
 
 
O’Donnell, Note, The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty Debate: Time for Some Clarification of the 
President’s Authority to Terminate a Treaty, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1601 (2002); David J. 
Scheffer, Comment, The Law of Treaty Termination as Applied to the United States De-Recognition of 
the Republic of China, 19 HARV. INT’L L. J. 931 (1978); Comment, Resolving Treaty Termination 
Disputes, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 1189 (1981).  
 12. See Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979); Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir. 
1979); Goldwater v. Carter, 481 F. Supp. 949 (D.D.C. 1979). 
 13. Only one scholarly paper has addressed the issue of whether the president can “un-sign” a 
treaty. See David C. Scott, Comment, Presidential Power to “Un-Sign” Treaties, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1447 (2002). Scott concludes that unilateral presidential unsigning is consistent with both international 
law and the Constitution. Id. at 1449. This Note offers an alternative perspective on the issue of 
unsigning and ultimately concludes that Scott’s arguments for unilateral presidential control over 
unsigning are not persuasive.  
 14. In addition to President Clinton’s reluctance about the ICC and President Bush’s outright 
hostility to the ICC, Congress expressed its opposition to the Rome Statute by passing several statutes 
designed to prevent American support of the ICC. See 22 U.S.C. § 7401 (2006); American 
Servicemembers’ Protection Act of 2002, 22 U.S.C. §§ 7421–7433 (2006); see also Galbraith, supra 
note 3, at 687; Adam Clymer, House Panel Approves Measures to Oppose New Global Court, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 11, 2002, at A3.  
 15. See, e.g., Koh, supra note 8, at 1508 (discussing the international political impact of 
President Bush’s decision to unsign the Rome Statute).  
 16. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 18, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 
[hereinafter Vienna Convention]; see also infra Part II. 
 17. Vienna Convention, supra note 16. 
 18. See, e.g., Swaine, supra note 5, at 2072–76; see also infra Part II. 
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unsigning the Rome Statute, the United States no longer considered itself 
bound by any “legal obligations arising from [President Clinton’s] 
signature on December 31, 2000.”19 Moreover, since unsigning the Rome 
Statute, the United States has sought to immunize itself from the reach of 
the ICC and has actively lobbied against the new court, in direct 
contravention of the object and purpose of the Rome Statute.20 If President 
Bush’s action of unsigning the Rome Statute were to establish a 
constitutional precedent for unsigning treaties, other previous American 
foreign policy commitments could be radically altered.21 An American 
precedent of unsigning treaties might also encourage other countries to do 
likewise and thereby change the landscape of conventional international 
law.22 As treaty unsigning can have such serious consequences, it is 
necessary to consider which branch or branches of government may have 
the power to unsign treaties.  
This Note addresses the question of whether the President can 
unilaterally unsign a treaty and concludes that he cannot. Before 
considering the potential arguments for and against the unilateral 
presidential power to unsign treaties, it is necessary to consider both the 
international and historical context in which this question arises. Thus, 
Part II examines the legal consequences of treaty signature under 
international law. Part III, in turn, considers the historical development of 
the presidential and senatorial treaty powers. Having established this 
framework for the discussion, Part IV focuses on the various constitutional 
arguments that can be advanced in the debate. Part V considers what 
criteria might be relevant for evaluating the strength of such arguments 
and analyzes the arguments of Part IV in light of these criteria. Finally, the 
Note concludes with a proposal that the decision to unsign a treaty should 
not be made by unilateral presidential action but should require, at 
minimum, support by a majority of the Senate.  
 
 
 19. Letter to U.N., supra note 6. 
 20. See Galbraith, supra note 3, at 693–96; Kircher, supra note 9, at 272–79; Schwartz, supra 
note 3, at 234–35; Tallman, supra note 3, at 1039–49; see also Eubany, supra note 5, at 119–29. But 
see Let the Child Live, ECONOMIST, Jan. 27, 2007, at 59. 
 21. See Koh, supra note 8, at 1508. 
 22. Consider the statement of the former head of the American delegation to the ICC: “[T]here is 
a whole list of treaties that we’ve ratified that other states have signed but not yet ratified. . . . If we 
‘unsign’ the ICC, we give a signal that a new practice is acceptable, and we lay the groundwork for 
undermining a whole range of treaties.” Mufson & Sipress, supra note 9, at A1. 
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II. LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF TREATY SIGNATURE AND UNSIGNATURE 
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Historically, the mere act of signature was enough to bind a state to a 
treaty.23 Because the rise of representative democracies has divided the 
treaty-making process into two phases (signature followed by ratification), 
contemporary international law does not give the same weight to treaty 
signature as it has in the past.24 In noting this development, Professor 
Rogoff has observed, “While at one time signature played a more 
important role in the process whereby a state assumed treaty obligations, 
today the crucial event is ratification.”25 Nonetheless, treaty signature has 
not become meaningless under international law.26 
Today, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties27 (Vienna 
Convention) codifies28 the customary international law rules29 regarding 
treaty formation, termination, and interpretation. While the United States 
has only signed—and not yet ratified—the Vienna Convention, both the 
executive30 and judicial31 branches view the Vienna Convention as 
 
 
 23. Swaine, supra note 5, at 2066; see also Martin A. Rogoff, The International Legal 
Obligations of Signatories to an Unratified Treaty, 32 ME. L. REV. 263, 266 (1980).  
 24. See Swaine, supra note 5, at 2066. 
 25. Rogoff, supra note 23, at 266–67. 
 26. See generally Joni S. Charme, The Interim Obligation of Article 18 of the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties: Making Sense of an Enigma, 25 GEO. WASH. J. INT’L L. & ECON. 71, 88–93 
(1992); Rogoff, supra note 23, at 267; Swaine, supra note 5, at 2067. 
 27. Vienna Convention, supra note 16. 
 28. See Territorial Dispute (Libya v. Chad), 1994 I.C.J. 4, 21 (Feb. 3); Legal Consequences for 
States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Nambia, Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16, 46–7 
(June 21); IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 608 (5th ed. 1998); LOUIS 
HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 416 (1993); Charme, supra note 26, at 
75; Evan Criddle, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties in U.S. Treaty Interpretation, 44 VA. 
J. INT’L L. 431, 443 (2004); Rogoff, supra note 23, at 284; Swaine, supra note 5, at 2065 n.20.  
 29. The Statute of the International Court of Justice describes customary international law as 
“general practice accepted as law.” Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1), June 26, 
1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 1060 (1945). A rule of customary international law binds all states which have not 
objected to the rule during the period of its formation. See generally BROWNLIE, supra note 28, at 4–
11. Customary international law “results from a general and consistent practice of states followed by 
them from a sense of legal obligation.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF 
THE UNITED STATES § 102 (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]. See also North Sea Continental Shelf 
(F.R.G. v. Den., F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 43–44 (Feb. 20).  
 30. See Secretary Rogers’s Report, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Transmitted to the 
Senate, Oct. 18, 1971, 65 Dep’t St. Bull. 684, 685 (1971) (observing that the Vienna Convention was 
“generally recognized as the authoritative guide to current treaty law and practice”); Contemporary 
Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 65 AM. J. INT’L L. 599, 605 (1971). See 
also Maria Frankowska, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Before United States Courts, 
28 VA. J. INT’L L. 281, 295–301 (1988). 
 31. See, e.g., Fujitsu Ltd. v. Fed. Express Corp., 247 F.3d 423, 433 (2d Cir. 2001) (“[W]e apply 
the rules of customary international law enunciated in the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
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expressing binding customary international law. Thus, for purposes of this 
analysis, the Vienna Convention serves as an authoritative statement of the 
international law rules regarding treaty signature.  
The Vienna Convention suggests two types of obligations that a state 
undertakes during the formation of a treaty. The more important 
obligation, stemming from ratification, directly binds a state to comply 
with the terms of the treaty.32 Article 18 of the Vienna Convention also 
indicates that a state assumes some obligations by merely signing a treaty. 
The article provides: 
 A State is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the 
object and purpose of a treaty when . . . [i]t has signed the treaty or 
has exchanged instruments constituting the treaty subject to 
ratification, acceptance or approval, until it shall have made its 
intention clear not to become a party to the treaty.33 
The main idea behind article 18 is that “the value of an undertaking 
ought not to be diminished prior to the transaction being completed.”34 
Writing well before the drafting of the Vienna Convention, Professor 
Crandall clarified that, after signature and prior to entry into force, 
“neither party may, without repudiating the proposed treaty, voluntarily 
place itself in a position where it cannot comply with the conditions as 
they existed at the time the treaty was signed.”35 Both the International 
Law Commission36 and the authors of the Harvard Draft,37 the two 
 
 
Treaties.”); Chubb & Son, Inc. v. Asiana Airlines, 214 F.3d 301, 309 (2d Cir. 2000) (“We therefore 
treat the Vienna Convention as an authoritative guide to the customary international law of treaties.”); 
Aquamar S.A. v. Del Monte Fresh Produce N.A., Inc., 179 F.3d 1279, 1296 n.40 (11th Cir. 1999); 
Kreimerman v. Casa Veerkamp, 22 F.3d 634, 638 n.9 (5th Cir. 1994) (“Although the United States is 
not a party to the Vienna Convention, it regards the substantive provisions of the Vienna Convention 
as codifying the international law of treaties.”). See generally Frankowska, supra note 30.  
 32. Article 14 of the Vienna Convention provides: 
 The consent of a State to be bound by a treaty is expressed when . . . [t]he representative 
of the State has signed the treaty subject to ratification[,] or . . . the intention of the State to 
sign the treaty subject to ratification appears from the full powers of its representative or was 
expressed during the negotiation.  
Vienna Convention, supra note 16, art. 14.  
 33. Id. art. 18 (emphasis added).  
 34. Jan Klabbers, How to Defeat a Treaty’s Object and Purpose Pending Entry into Force: 
Towards Manifest Intent, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 283, 294 (2001). 
 35. SAMUEL B. CRANDALL, TREATIES: THEIR MAKING AND ENFORCEMENT 343–44 (2d ed. 
1916). 
 36. The General Assembly of the United Nations created the International Law Commission to 
codify existing customary international law and to participate in the progressive development of 
international law. See Statute of the International Law Commission, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/4/Rev. 1 
(1962). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss7/9
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original drafters of what eventually became article 18, also emphasized 
that signature imposes an obligation on a state to not perform acts that 
would render later ratification meaningless.38 The interim obligation 
articulated in article 18 means that even when a state has not yet ratified a 
treaty, its signature still binds it not to act in a way inconsistent with 
eventual ratification.39  
While the customary international law status of article 18 is subject to 
some debate,40 over one hundred countries have ratified the Vienna 
Convention.41 Further, prior to the drafting of the Vienna Convention, 
some international courts and arbitral tribunals had already recognized that 
treaty signature imposes an obligation not to defeat the object and purpose 
of the treaty.42 For this reason, some scholars have argued that article 18 is 
simply a codification of customary international law regarding the 
consequences of treaty signature.43 Regardless of whether article 18 is 
universally accepted as the codification of custom, the United States has 
expressed the view that article 18 represents customary international law.44 
 
 
 37. Harvard Research in International Law, Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties, 29 AM. J. 
INT’L L. SPEC. SUPP. 653 (1935) [hereinafter Harvard Draft].  
 38. See Charme, supra note 26, at 91–93; see also Harvard Draft, supra note 37, at 680–81 (“[A] 
signatory state has a right to assume that the other [state] will regard its signature as having been 
seriously given, that ordinarily it will proceed to ratification, and that in the meantime, it will not adopt 
a policy which would render ratification useless or would place obstacles in the way of the execution 
of the provisions of the treaty, once its ratifications have been given.”).  
 39. For extended discussions of the meaning of article 18, see Charme, supra note 26, at 98–114; 
Klabbers, supra note 34; Paul V. McDade, The Interim Obligation Between Signature and Ratification 
of a Treaty, 32 NETH. INT’L L. REV. 5, 9–28 (1985); Rogoff, supra note 23, at 283–88.  
 40. See ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 94 (2d ed. 2000); GLENNON, 
CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY, supra note 11, at 171–72; I.M. SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION 
ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 38–40 (1973); Charme, supra note 26, at 76–77.  
 41. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, List of Participants, http://untreaty.un.org/ 
ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/partI/chapterXXIII/treaty1.asp (last visited Feb. 5, 2007). 
 42. See generally Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime 
of Genocide, Advisory Opinion, 1951 I.C.J. 15 (May 28); Certain German Interests in Polish Upper 
Silesia (Ger. v. Pol.), 1926 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 7 (May 25); Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions 
(Greece v. U.K.), 1924 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 2 (Aug. 30); Megalidis v. Turkey, 8 Receuil des Decisions 
des Tribunaux Mixtes 386, 395 (Turkish-Greek Mixed Arb. Trib. 1928), reprinted in 1927/28 ANN. 
DIG. PUB. INT’L L. 395 (Arnold D. McNair & H. Lauterpacht eds., 1931). For a more extensive 
discussion of these cases’ holdings in regard to the effects of treaty signature, see Rogoff, supra note 
23, at 275–80. 
 43. See Charme, supra note 26, at 77–84 (observing that in addition to the prior case law, the 
drafting history of article 18 suggests that it was meant to be a codification rather than an extension of 
customary international law); cf. Rogoff, supra note 23, at 272 (“While some commentators regard this 
line of decisions as establishing a legal obligation not to defeat the object and purpose of the treaty 
prior to its entry into force, others regard it as inconclusive at best.”).  
 44. See supra note 31; see also Robert E. Dalton, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: 
Consequences for the United States, 78 AM. SOC’Y INT’L PROC. 276, 278 (1984); Frankowska, supra 
note 30, at 299 n.82. 
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Thus, as a practical matter, other countries that have signed treaties with 
the United States expect that it will not act against the object and purpose 
of those treaties, even when the United States has decided not to ratify 
those treaties.  
Beyond invoking the interim obligation of article 18, treaty signature 
has other legal consequences for the signing state under international law. 
The Vienna Convention provides that “[t]he text of a treaty is established 
as authentic and definitive . . . by the signature, signature ad referendum or 
initialling by the representatives of [the signing] States of the text of the 
treaty.”45 Signature also “establishes the terms by which a treaty is to 
come into force, such as by setting a time limit for ratification or 
stipulating the minimum number of signatories.”46 Moreover, “[s]ignature 
may impose the obligation to comply with . . . provisions relating to the 
submission of the agreement for ratification in accordance with the 
internal law of the signatories [and] provisions relating to the exchange of 
ratifications or their deposit.”47  
It is unclear how unsigning a treaty fits into this customary 
international law framework. While there is no established custom related 
to “unsignature,” the underlying notion that international law is based 
upon the consent of states48 suggests that unsigning should be permissible 
under the Vienna Convention. Indeed, unsigning a treaty may simply 
clarify a country’s desire not to become a party to the treaty.49 The Bush 
administration adopted such a view in its letter to the U.N. purporting to 
unsign the Rome Statute. The letter stated that “the United States does not 
intend to become a party to the treaty” and concluded that “[a]ccordingly, 
the United States has no legal obligations arising from its signature on 
December 31, 2000.”50 Under this view, the act of unsigning would relieve 
a state of its obligations to abide by the object and purpose of the treaty.  
On the other hand, unsigning could also be perceived as an action 
which “defeat[s] the object and purpose of [the] treaty.”51 One of the 
major aims of multilateral treaty negotiation is to ensure that all states 
 
 
 45. Vienna Convention, supra note 16, art. 10. 
 46. Swaine, supra note 5, at 2067.  
 47. Rogoff, supra note 23, at 267. 
 48. See HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE 
INTERNATIONAL COURT 338 (1958).  
 49. See Vienna Convention, supra note 16 (“A state is obliged to refrain from acts which would 
defeat the object and purpose of a treaty, . . . until it shall have made its intention clear not to become 
a party to the treaty . . .”) (emphasis added). 
 50. Letter to U.N., supra note 6. 
 51. Vienna Convention, supra note 16. 
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party to the negotiations reach a common understanding of the purpose 
and goals of the treaty. In this way, multilateral treaty negotiation is as 
much about international norm construction as it is about the mutual 
assumption of legal obligations.52 Under this view, one of the very 
purposes of the treaty is to establish consensus about the ideals contained 
in the treaty.53 Indeed, the reason that some countries sign multilateral 
treaties is to gain assurance that other countries are committed to the same 
goals.54 From this perspective, a state’s unsigning of a treaty—as well as 
any declaration that the state opposes the treaty’s goals—would be a 
contradiction of the treaty process. As the Vienna Convention and other 
international instruments are silent about whether unsigning is permissible 
under international law, either interpretation is possible. 
III. HISTORY OF THE TREATY POWER UNDER THE CONSTITUTION 
The text of the Constitution provides little guidance about the roles of 
the President and Congress in treaty formation and termination. Article II, 
Section 2 states, “He [the President] shall have Power, by and with the 
Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds 
of the Senators present concur.”55 From this general language, a complex 
procedure has developed for the formation of treaties. This Part traces this 
evolution of the treaty power and gives particular emphasis to the shifting 
roles of the President and Congress in both treaty formation and 
termination.  
A. The Development of Presidential and Congressional Roles in Treaty 
Formation 
The treaty-making process generally involves three major steps: (1) 
negotiation, (2) signature, and (3) ratification. Over time, the roles of both 
the President and the Senate have evolved with respect to each of these 
phases. In general, however, a historical practice has developed such that 
the President is solely responsible for the first two steps in the treaty 
formation process (negotiation and signature) while the Senate controls the 
 
 
 52. See generally Christine Chinkin, Normative Development in the International Legal System, 
in COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE: THE ROLE OF NON-BINDING NORMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL 
LEGAL SYSTEM 21 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2000).  
 53. See id.  
 54. See id. 
 55. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
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third step of ratification.56 The problem with unsigning is that it falls 
between the second and third steps. Thus, it is not clear whether the 
unsigning falls within the President’s exclusive responsibility during the 
signature phase or whether the unsigning is incident to the ratification 
process controlled by the Senate. Before considering the difficult issue of 
how to view unsigning,57 it is necessary to understand the roles that the 
Senate and the President have historically played in these three phases of 
treaty creation.  
The “advice and consent” language of the Constitution suggests that 
the Senate should have some role in negotiating treaties.58 However, the 
notion that the Senate could assist in treaty negotiation was briefly tested 
and quickly rejected by President Washington.59 After the initial failed 
involvement of the Senate in treaty negotiation, the practice of sole 
negotiation of treaties by the executive developed.60 Treaty negotiation 
became associated with the President’s power to conduct foreign 
relations.61 While the President is now the exclusive negotiator of 
treaties,62 in practice the executive branch often consults with Congress 
about ongoing multilateral treaty negotiations and the potential 
ramifications of contemplated treaties.63 At times, disputes have arisen 
between Congress and the President regarding the effect of conflicting 
presidential and senatorial interpretations of a treaty during its negotiation 
stages.64 However, the President’s monopoly on treaty negotiation has 
never been seriously questioned.65  
 
 
 56. PETER M. SHANE & HAROLD H. BRUFF, THE LAW OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 520 (1988). 
 57. See infra Parts IV and V. 
 58. See FISHER, supra note 11, at 217–18; SHANE & BRUFF, supra note 56, at 521 (“President 
Washington originally interpreted the Senate’s ‘advice and consent’ power to mean that, before a 
treaty is negotiated, the Senate’s advice must be sought on a preliminary basis.”).  
 59. According to Professor Corwin, President Washington’s attempt to seek the advice of the 
Senate regarding a treaty was an epic disaster: “The somber truth is that the conception of the Senate 
as presidential council in the diplomatic field broke down the first time it was put to the test.” EDWARD 
S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS, 1787–1984, at 239–40 (5th ed. 1984). For a 
thorough discussion of the minimal role of the Senate in treaty negotiation, see FISHER, supra note 11, 
at 217–31.  
 60. See CORWIN, supra note 59, at 240; Scott, supra note 13, at 1450.  
 61. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936); RESTATEMENT, 
supra note 29, at § 339 cmt. a.  
 62. See Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 319 (“He makes treaties with the advice and consent of the 
Senate; but he alone negotiates.”); HENKIN, supra note 11, at 177. 
 63. See HENKIN, supra note 11, at 178; Phillip R. Trimble & Alexander W. Koff, All Fall Down: 
The Treaty Power in the Clinton Administration, 16 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 55, 55–56 (1998).  
 64. These disputes have concerned whether the President’s or the Senate’s interpretation of the 
treaty is binding for the interpretation of treaty implementation. See generally Joseph R. Biden, Jr. & 
John B. Ritch, III, The Treaty Power: Upholding a Constitutional Partnership, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 
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Accompanying this power to negotiate, the executive has historically 
borne responsibility for the actual act of signing treaties. While the 
Constitution does not indicate the precise roles of the President and the 
Senate in the treaty-making process, it clearly envisions that the President 
will act as the representative of the United States before other sovereign 
governments.66 Additionally, the need for a unitary voice in diplomatic 
and treaty engagements67 has allowed the practice of presidential signature 
of treaties to remain unchallenged.68  
In addition to sole negotiation and signature powers, some early 
Presidents, such as John Adams, also claimed an ability to enter into 
binding executive agreements69 without congressional involvement.70 
Despite the Constitution’s clear statement that the formation of treaties 
requires approval of at least two-thirds of the Senate,71 many Presidents 
since Adams have negotiated and enacted executive agreements with 
foreign governments.72 As these agreements have the same binding force 
as treaties, scholars have argued that they should be formulated under the 
same conditions.73 On the other hand, proponents of executive agreements 
contend that because these agreements are not technically treaties, they do 
not have to meet identical constitutional requirements.74 A further 
justification for such agreements is that they fall under the President’s 
general executive power and thus are not subject to the requirements of the 
 
 
1529 (1989); Lawrence J. Block et al., The Senate’s Pie-in-the-Sky Treaty Interpretation: Power and 
the Quest for Legislative Supremacy, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1481 (1989); Harold Hongju Koh et al., The 
Treaty Power, 43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 101 (1988); Phillip R. Trimble & Jack S. Weiss, The Role of the 
President, the Senate and Congress with Respect to Arms Control Treaties Concluded by the United 
States, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 645, 694–702 (1991). 
 65. Cf. William Whitwell Dewhurst, Does the Constitution Make the President Sole Negotiator 
of Treaties?, 30 YALE L. J. 478 (1920). 
 66. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Ex. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936) (“[T]he President 
alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation.”). 
 67. See Glennon, Treaty Process Reform, supra note 11, at 85. 
 68. See HENKIN, supra note 11, at 177. 
 69. Scholars have used the term “executive agreement” to refer to treaty-like agreements with 
foreign governments entered into by the President without congressional involvement. See, e.g., Peter 
J. Spiro, Treaties, Executive Agreements, and Constitutional Method, 79 TEX. L. REV. 961, 963 
(2001).  
 70. As early as 1799, John Adams claimed to have authority to make executive agreements. 
Glennon, Treaty Process Reform, supra note 11, at 85 (citing R.B. Lillich, The Gravel Amendment to 
the Trade Reform Act of 1974: Congress Checkmates a Lump Sum Agreement, 69 AM. J. INT’L L. 837, 
844 (1975)).  
 71. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.  
 72. See HENKIN, supra note 11, at 173–89.  
 73. See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form 
Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221, 1276–78 (1995). 
 74. See Glennon, Treaty Process Reform, supra note 11, at 85. 
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treaty power.75 However, the strongest argument for the constitutionality 
of these executive agreements is that they have been accepted by both 
presidential and congressional practice for, at least, the past fifty years.76 
Indeed, regardless of their constitutionality, executive agreements have 
become a powerful way for Presidents to circumvent the treaty power.77  
Despite—or, perhaps, due to—the development of the presidential 
monopoly over treaty negotiation, treaty signature, and executive 
agreements, the Senate has always maintained control over the ratification 
process.78 While the President ultimately ratifies treaties,79 the 
constitutional text is clear that he can only do so with senatorial “Advice 
and Consent.”80 However, the Senate “is not constrained to base its 
approval or disapproval decisions upon any particular criteria. Thus, the 
Senate may deny its consent not because it thinks a proposed treaty would 
contravene the national interest, but because, for example, of partisan 
politics.”81 Today, the rules of Senate procedure82 govern the process of 
Senate consent.  
The ratification process begins when the President submits a signed 
treaty to the Senate. After an initial reading by the entire Senate,83 the 
treaty is sent to the Committee on Foreign Relations (the Committee).84 
The Committee places the treaty on its calendar, where it can stay for 
years until the Committee takes action.85 Once the Committee decides to 
consider the treaty, it may—and typically does—hold public hearings on 
the treaty, where all interested parties can comment on the treaty.86 Based 
on these hearings or upon its own findings, the Committee can then 
recommend the treaty to the full Senate for consideration.87 The 
Committee usually recommends a treaty to the Senate in one of four ways: 
 
 
 75. Id. 
 76. See Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 HARV. L. REV. 799 
(1995). 
 77. See Spiro, supra note 69, at 962–63. 
 78. See HENKIN, supra note 11, at 179. 
 79. Id. at 184 (“Once the Senate has consented, the President is free to make (or not to make) the 
treaty and the Senate has no further authority in respect of it.”).  
 80. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 81. SHANE & BRUFF, supra note 56, at 521. 
 82. United States Senate Committee on Rules & Administration, STANDING RULES OF THE 
SENATE, http://rules.senate.gov/senaterules/ (last visited Mar. 5, 2006) [hereinafter SENATE RULES]. 
 83. Id. R. XXX(1)(a). 
 84. Id. R. XXV(1)(j)(1)(17). 
 85. Rules of the Committee on Foreign Relations, R. 9(b), http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/ 
senate/srules11.htm (last visited Mar. 5, 2006). 
 86. Id. R. 9(d). 
 87. Id. 
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“(1) approval without change, (2) approval with conditions not altering the 
text, (3) approval if the text is amended, or (4) a combination of the last 
two possibilities.”88  
Once the Committee has made its recommendation, the full Senate 
considers the Committee’s report and can propose its own amendments, 
which it incorporates into a ratification resolution.89 The Senate then 
considers this ratification resolution, which it may “amen[d] in the form of 
reservations, declarations, statements, or understandings.”90 After these 
final amendments to the resolution, the Senate votes on the ratification 
resolution. If the resolution receives votes from two-thirds of the senators, 
then the treaty is sent to the President for final ratification.91 If the 
ratification resolution does not receive the required two-thirds majority 
approval, then the Senate may return the treaty to the President by 
adopting a resolution through simple majority vote.92  
Thus, while in the Senate for ratification, a treaty can be “detoured” for 
extensive periods of time or even indefinitely. It is also important to note 
that even if a resolution for ratification passes the Senate with the required 
two-thirds vote, the President still retains ultimate discretion over whether 
to ratify the treaty.93 In short, unlike the President’s control over treaty 
negotiation and signature that has carved out a sphere of exclusive 
presidential action in treaty-making, the Senate’s historic control over the 
ratification procedure has not resulted in a monopoly of the ratification 
power. 
B. The Development of Presidential and Congressional Roles in Treaty 
Termination 
While the Constitution clearly gives both the President and one house 
of Congress a role in treaty formation, the Framers were silent about the 
issue of treaty withdrawal or termination. This constitutional silence has 
led to much dispute over the roles of Congress and the President in treaty 
termination, and a varied historical practice.94 Because unsigning can in 
 
 
 88. Scott, supra note 13, at 1452. 
 89. SENATE RULES, supra note 81, R. XXX(1)(c). 
 90. Id. The Senate’s ability to propose reservations to treaties has been the subject of much 
debate. For different considerations of this issue, see Block et al., supra note 64; Riesenfeld & Abbott, 
supra note 11; Trimble & Weiss, supra note 64.  
 91. SENATE RULES, supra note 82, R. XXX(1)(d).  
 92. Id. 
 93. See id. 
 94. See Sabis, supra note 11, at 235–43. For several discussions of the presidential and 
congressional roles in treaty termination, see generally supra note 11. 
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many respects be likened to treaty termination, this historical termination 
practice is relevant for evaluating the potential constitutional roles of 
Congress and the President in unsigning. 
The United States’ first treaty termination was carried out by an act of 
Congress. In the Act of July 7, 1798 (the Act), Congress terminated a 
series of trade treaties with France.95 In Hooper v. United States,96 the 
Court of Claims held that such a termination was valid.97 Rejecting an 
argument that the Act had not effectively terminated the treaties, the court 
held that “[t]he annulling act issued from competent authority and was the 
official act of the Government of the United States. So far as it was within 
the power of one party to abrogate these treaties it was undisputedly done 
by the [Act].”98 Thus, Hooper seemed to establish that “an Act of 
Congress, signed by the president, was the proper manner in which the 
U.S. could terminate a treaty.”99  
Following Hooper, subsequent practice confirmed the view that treaty 
termination should be accomplished by joint presidential and 
congressional action.100 Prior to 1979, nearly all U.S. treaties were 
terminated with congressional direction or approval.101 Even in cases 
where Presidents appeared to terminate treaties unilaterally, they were 
often acting subsequent to congressional approval.102 Furthermore, several 
early Presidents explicitly acknowledged congressional control over treaty 
termination.103 For example, “President Polk specifically requested that 
Congress legislatively approve his authority to give [the British 
termination] notice under the terms of the Oregon Territory Treaty with 
 
 
 95. See Hooper v. United States, 22 Ct. Cl. 408, 418 (1887). 
 96. 22 Ct. Cl. 408 (1887).  
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 418. 
 99. Sabis, supra note 11, at 236. 
 100. See id. at 236–38. 
 101. See Goldwater v. Carter, 481 F. Supp. 949, 964 (D.D.C. 1979) (“The predominate United 
States’ practice in terminating treaties, including those containing notice provisions, has involved 
mutual action by the executive and legislative branches.”). When President Carter unilaterally 
terminated the Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan in 1978, the State Department cited only twelve 
prior instances of unilateral treaty termination. See Memorandum on President’s Power to Give Notice 
of Termination of U.S.-R.O.C. Mutual Defense Treaty (Dec. 15, 1978), reprinted in STAFF OF SENATE 
COMM. ON FOR. REL., 95TH CONG., 2D SESS., TERMINATION OF TREATIES: THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
ALLOCATION OF POWER at 395 (Comm. Print 1978).  
 102. Several scholars have argued that, of the twelve examples cited by the State Department, the 
President acted without congressional authorization in only two cases. See, e.g., Sabis, supra note 11, 
at 236; Jonathan York Thomas, The Abuse of History: A Refutation of the State Department Analysis 
of Alleged Instances of Independent Presidential Treaty Termination, 6 YALE STUD. WORLD PUB. 
ORD. 27 (1979). 
 103. See Sabis, supra note 11, at 236. 
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Great Britain.”104 President Grant also noted, with regard to the British 
Treaty of 1842, that “it is for the wisdom of Congress to determine 
whether the article of the treaty relating to extradition is to be any longer 
regarded as obligatory on the Government of the United States or as 
forming part of the supreme law of the land.”105  
Additionally, for many decades, federal courts seemed to confirm that 
treaty termination is best accomplished through congressional action. For 
example, in Ropes v. Clinch,106 the Federal Circuit Court for the Southern 
District of New York observed: 
There are three modes in which congress [sic] may practically yet 
efficiently annul or destroy the operative effect of any treaty with a 
foreign country. They may do it by giving the notice which the 
treaty contemplates shall be given before it shall be abrogated, in 
cases in which, like the present, such a notice was provided for; or, 
if the terms of the treaty require no such notice, they may do it by 
the formal abrogation of the treaty at once, by express terms; and 
even where, as in this case, there is a provision for the notice, I 
think the government of the United States may disregard even that, 
and declare that “the treaty shall be, from and after this date, at an 
end . . . .”107 
The Supreme Court also recognized that Congress can effectively repeal 
provisions of a treaty simply by passing a federal statute that is 
inconsistent with the terms of the treaty108 and is clearly meant to repeal 
the treaty’s provisions.109 
In Neely v. Henkel,110 the Supreme Court suggested that Congress has 
the power to terminate treaties under the Necessary and Proper Clause.111 
The case required the Court to determine the validity of certain provisions 
 
 
 104. Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697, 724 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
 105. Id. at 726 (citing 9 J. RICHARDSON, MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 4324, 4327 
(Washington, 1897)). 
 106. 20 F. Cas. 1171 (C.C. S.D.N.Y. 1871). The case involved the determination of the validity of 
a congressional act which appeared to conflict with a treaty. See id. 
 107. Id. at 1174. 
 108. See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 719–21 (1893); Chae Chan Ping v. 
United States, 130 U.S. 581, 600 (1889); Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888); Edye v. 
Robertson, 112 U.S. 580, 599 (1884).  
 109. See Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64, 118 (1804) (requiring that statutes not 
be construed to violate international law if any other plausible construction is available). This principle 
is known as the “Rule of Charming Betsy.” See RESTATEMENT, supra note 29, at § 114. 
 110. 180 U.S. 109 (1901). 
 111. See Sabis, supra note 11, at 238. 
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of the Act of June 6, 1900, which gave effect to parts of the Treaty of 
Paris.112 In upholding the Act, the Court concluded: 
The power of Congress to make all laws necessary and proper for 
carrying into execution [its] powers enumerated in section 8 of 
article I of the Constitution . . . includes the power to enact such 
legislation as is appropriate to give efficacy to any stipulations 
which it is competent for the President by and with the advice and 
consent of the Senate to insert in a treaty with a foreign power.113 
As some of the stipulations which the President and the Senate incorporate 
into treaties are termination clauses, the Court’s conclusion in Neely 
suggests that the Constitution grants Congress the power to determine the 
method for treaty termination under the Necessary and Proper Clause.  
The long-standing precedent of treaty termination by an act of 
Congress (or at least by action pursuant to congressional approval) was 
dramatically cut short in 1979 during the events surrounding Goldwater v. 
Carter.114 The case resulted from President Carter’s decision to 
unilaterally terminate the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954 between the 
United States and Taiwan.115 As the termination of the treaty involved a 
number of political issues,116 several senators strongly disagreed with 
President Carter’s decision. In response, Arizona Senator Barry 
Goldwater, along with others, filed a suit against President Carter in the 
Federal District Court in Washington, D.C.117  
Senator Goldwater sought injunctive relief as well as a judgment 
declaring the President’s termination of the Mutual Defense Treaty 
unconstitutional.118 In particular, Senator Goldwater and the other 
plaintiffs argued that “President Carter’s unilateral notice of termination 
violated [the senators’] legislative right to be consulted and to vote on the 
termination and also impaired the effectiveness of prior votes approving 
 
 
 112. Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. at 110–11. 
 113. Id. at 121. 
 114. 444 U.S. 996 (1979). 
 115. Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of China, U.S.-R.O.C., 
Dec. 2, 1954, 6 U.S.T. 433. 
 116. The termination of the treaty with the Republic of China was one of the conditions required 
by the People’s Republic of China (P.R.C.) for the normalization of relations between the United 
States and the P.R.C. In this way, the termination of the treaty was designed to harmonize American 
relations with Communist China. See VICTORIA MARIE KRAFT, THE U.S. CONSTITUTION AND 
FOREIGN POLICY: TERMINATING THE TAIWAN TREATY 71 (1991); Scheffer, supra note 11, at 932–33. 
 117. See Goldwater v. Carter, 481 F. Supp. 949 (D.D.C. 1979). 
 118. Id. at 950. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss7/9
p 1941 Mclaurin book pages.doc 10/31/2007  
 
 
 
 
 
2006] CAN THE PRESIDENT “UNSIGN” A TREATY? 1957 
 
 
 
 
the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty.”119 The district court found that the 
political question doctrine did not bar it from hearing the case and held 
that President Carter’s action was unconstitutional.120 The court held that 
“[i]t would be incompatible with our system of checks and balances if the 
executive power in the area of foreign affairs were construed to encompass 
a unilateral power to terminate treaties.”121 The court explicitly rejected 
President Carter’s arguments that he had the authority to unilaterally 
terminate treaties pursuant to the executive’s appointments power,122 
recognition power,123 or general foreign affairs power.124 Rather, the court 
reasoned that “[l]ike treaty formation, treaty termination is comprised of a 
series of acts that seek to maintain a constitutional balance.”125 The court 
concluded that the President “alone cannot effect the repeal of a law of the 
land which was formed by joint action of the executive and legislative 
branches, whether that law be a statute or a treaty.”126  
The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit reversed, agreeing with the 
lower court’s finding that the political question doctrine was not a bar to 
justiciability, but concluding that President Carter acted within his foreign 
affairs power when he terminated the Mutual Defense Treaty.127 The court 
of appeals disagreed with the lower court’s arguments that the Supremacy 
Clause prevented the president from unilaterally terminating treaties128 and 
that treaty termination is properly analogized to treaty formation.129 On the 
 
 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 963. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 960 (“The removal power . . . concerns the President’s administrative control over his 
subordinates and flows from the President’s obligations to see that the laws are faithfully executed. By 
contrast, treaty termination impacts upon the substantial role of Congress in foreign affairs—especially 
in the context of a mutual defense pact involving the potential exercise of congressional war powers—
and is a contradiction rather than a corollary of the Executive’s enforcement obligations.”) (citations 
omitted). 
 123. Id. at 961 (“A holding that the recognition power incidentally confers the power to make an 
executive agreement settling property claims . . . does not justify an incidental power to terminate 
treaties without congressional approval.”). 
 124. Id. (“While the President may be the sole organ of communication with foreign governments, 
he is clearly not the sole maker of foreign policy. In short, the conduct of foreign relations is not a 
plenary executive power.”). 
 125. Id. at 962. 
 126. Id. at 963. 
 127. Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697, 704 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
 128. Id. at 705 (“The fact that the Constitution, statutes, and treaties are all listed in the Supremacy 
Clause as being superior to any form of state law does not mean that the making and unmaking of 
treaties can be analogized to the making and unmaking of domestic statutes any more than it can be 
analogized to the making or unmaking of a constitutional amendment.”). 
 129. Id. at 704 (“The constitutional institution of advice and consent of the Senate, provided two-
thirds of the Senators concur, is a special and extraordinary condition of the exercise by the President 
of certain specified powers under Article II. It is not lightly to be extended in instances not set forth in 
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contrary, the court reasoned that as “[n]o specific role is spelled out in [] 
the Constitution . . . for the Senate or the Congress as a whole [to 
terminate treaties]. . . . [The] power consequently devolves upon the 
President, and there is no basis for a court to imply a restriction on the 
President’s power to terminate not contained in the Constitution.”130  
On appeal, rather than resolving the dispute between the lower courts 
about the presidential and congressional roles in treaty termination, the 
Supreme Court dismissed the case as falling under the political question 
doctrine.131 Addressing the political nature of the dispute, Justice 
Rehnquist wrote for a plurality of the Court: 
In light of the absence of any constitutional provision governing the 
termination of a treaty, and the fact that different termination 
procedures may be appropriate for different treaties . . . the instant 
case in my view also “must surely be controlled by political 
standards.” 
 . . . [W]e are asked to settle a dispute between coequal branches 
of our Government, each of which has resources available to protect 
and assert its interests.132 
In concurrence, Justice Powell refused to find that the issue was non-
justiciable, but instead indicated: 
The Judicial Branch should not decide issues affecting the 
allocation of power between the President and Congress until the 
political branches reach a constitutional impasse. Otherwise, we 
would encourage small groups or even individual Members of 
Congress to seek judicial resolution of issues before the normal 
political process has the opportunity to resolve the conflict.133 
Only Justice Brennan would have reached the merits of the case and 
would have found President Carter’s action constitutional.134 As for the 
rest of the court, the language of Justices Powell and Rehnquist suggest 
 
 
the Constitution. Such an extension by implication is not proper unless that implication is 
unmistakably clear.”). 
 130. Id. at 708. 
 131. Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 996–97 (1979). 
 132. Id. at 1003–04 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (citation omitted). 
 133. Id. at 997 (Powell, J., concurring). 
 134. Id. at 1007 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“Abrogation of the defense treaty with Taiwan was a 
necessary incident to Executive recognition of the Peking Government, because the defense treaty was 
predicated upon the now-abandoned view that the Taiwan Government was the only legitimate 
political authority in China.”).  
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that the case was not yet ripe for decision by the Court. Thus, the Court 
did not foreclose discussion of the issue of which branch has power over 
treaty termination, but rather suggested that such a discussion must be 
initiated by the legislature and the executive.  
Despite the Court’s non-holding on the issue of treaty termination, 
many subsequent scholars and Presidents have viewed Goldwater as 
establishing the President’s power to unilaterally terminate treaties.135 For 
example, President Ronald Regan claimed to have unilaterally terminated 
the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation Between the United 
States and Nicaragua.136 However, he was actually acting “under the 
emergency provisions of the International Emergency Economic Powers 
Act of 1977, and, thus, with authorization from Congress.”137 More 
recently, in 2001, President Bush sparked heated debate by unilaterally 
terminating the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.138 Additionally, the 
Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States139 
concludes: 
[T]he President has the power: (a) to suspend or terminate an 
agreement in accordance with its terms; [and] (b) to make the 
determination that would justify the United States in terminating or 
suspending an agreement because of its violation by another party 
or because of supervening events, and to proceed to terminate or 
suspend the agreement on behalf of the United States.140  
However, many scholars have contested the accuracy of the Restatement’s 
view.141  
In any case, the historical practice preceding Goldwater in which treaty 
termination only occurred with congressional approval has now given way 
 
 
 135. Miller, supra note 11, at 868–70. 
 136. See Stuart Taylor, Jr., Reagan’s Power Wide Under Emergency Law, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 
1985, at A10. 
 137. Sabis, supra note 11, at 237. 
 138. See David E. Sanger & Elisabeth Bumiller, U.S. to Pull Out of ABM Treaty, Clearing Path 
for Antimissile Tests, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2001, at A1. For a discussion of the treaty termination 
debates surrounding President Bush’s decision, see Sabis, supra note 11; O’Donnell, supra note 11; 
Scott, supra note 13. 
 139. The American Law Institute drafted the Restatement in an attempt to summarize domestic 
law impacting foreign relations as well as international law affecting the United States. The Supreme 
Court has consulted the Restatement in its discussion of international law. See, e.g., Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 695 (2004). 
 140. RESTATEMENT, supra note 29, § 339. 
 141. See generally Moriarty, supra note 11; Sabis, supra note 11; Miller, supra note 11. These 
scholars argue that the issue of which branch controls treaty termination was not decided by Goldwater 
and thus remains an open question. 
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to a new era of unilateral presidential termination. As Professor Henkin 
has observed, “At the end of the twentieth century, it is apparently 
accepted that the President has authority under the Constitution to 
denounce or otherwise terminate a treaty. . . .”142 The congressional and 
presidential roles in this post-Goldwater era are not yet well defined. The 
place of unsigning in such an era is also unclear. However, this historical 
understanding provides a useful framework in which to consider the 
various constitutional arguments that could be raised for and against 
unilateral presidential unsigning. 
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENTS REGARDING UNSIGNING 
While many scholars have considered the proper constitutional roles 
for the President and Congress in treaty formation and treaty 
termination,143 unsigning does not fit nicely into either one of these 
categories. On the one hand, unsigning purports to simply undo the treaty 
signature which occurs during treaty formation.144 On the other hand, 
unsigning may also repudiate the agreement that the treaty represents and 
thereby terminate (or breach) any obligations assumed by signature.145 
Because unsigning can have a function in both the treaty formation and 
termination processes, analogies to the constitutional roles of the executive 
and the legislature in these processes are helpful in considering the proper 
allocation of power between the President and Congress in unsigning. 
Using such analogies, this Part outlines the potential arguments for and 
against the President’s power to unilaterally unsign treaties. 
A. Originalist Arguments 
1. Textual Arguments 
The text of the Constitution is silent about unsigning. Only the 
language of Article II, Section 2 directly addresses treaty formation.146 
Despite this textual silence, a few observations can be made about the text 
of the Treaty Clause. The Constitution states that the President “shall have 
Power . . . to make Treaties.”147 This language reveals an affirmative grant 
 
 
 142. HENKIN, supra note 11, at 214. 
 143. See supra note 11.  
 144. See supra text accompanying notes 48–50. 
 145. See supra text accompanying notes 51–54. 
 146. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 147. Id. (emphasis added).  
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of power to the President.148 The placement of the Treaty Clause within 
Article II further emphasizes that the treaty power is primarily entrusted to 
the President.149 Under this view, the requirement of senatorial advice and 
consent should be read narrowly. Indeed, historically, the President has 
signed treaties unilaterally and has ultimately decided whether to ratify 
treaties to which the Senate has consented.150  
In order to make treaties, as part of his Article II duties, the President 
must decide whether to sign them.151 Thus, the argument goes, incident to 
this power of signature is the power to unsign agreements. If the President 
has the authority to bind the United States to an agreement that the Senate 
has authorized him to ratify, then he must also have the power to 
determine that the United States no longer wishes to support particular 
agreements with its signature. Scott has argued that “[b]ecause it is clearly 
within his power to refuse to ratify the treaty, it follows that the President 
has the power to withdraw unilaterally a disfavored treaty from the 
Senate.”152 Unsigning is an efficient way to withdraw a treaty not only 
from the Senate, but from further national consideration. Unsigning also 
frees the United States from the obligations assumed by signature. 
Because the Framers entrusted the President with the decision to bind the 
United States to international commitments, they surely must have also 
wanted the President to have the exclusive authority to unsign any 
contemplated agreements.  
However, the Framers did not entrust the power to bind the nation 
solely to the President. On the contrary, the Constitution creates an 
important role for the Senate in assuming international obligations. The 
Treaty Clause permits the President to make treaties only “by and with the 
 
 
 148. Scott, supra note 13, at 1458. 
 149. See Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697, 705 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (“It is significant that the treaty 
power appears in Article II of the Constitution, relating to the executive branch, and not in Article I, 
setting forth the powers of the legislative branch. It is the President as Chief Executive who is given 
the constitutional authority to enter into a treaty; and even after he has obtained the consent of the 
Senate it is for him decide whether to ratify a treaty and put it into effect. Senatorial confirmation of a 
treaty concededly does not obligate the President to go forward with a treaty if he concludes that it is 
not in the public interest to do so.”); see also Scott, supra note 13, at 1461.  
 150. See supra text accompanying note 92. 
 151. HENKIN, supra note 11, at 177. 
 152. Scott, supra note 13, at 1458. But see GLENNON, CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY, supra note 
11, at 174–75 (“Because the President (should the Senate give its consent) retains the discretion to 
decline to proceed to ratification, it might seem sensible that the President can withdraw a treaty from 
the Senate without its consent; after all, Senate consideration of the treaty would be pointless if it was 
clear from the outset that ratification by the President would not follow. Nonetheless, practicality 
argues against such presidential authority, since at that point the Senate, not the President, has custody 
of the official treaty documents; they are not then within the President’s control.”).  
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Advice and Consent of the Senate” and “provided two thirds of the 
Senators present concur.”153 This language indicates that the treaty power 
was meant to be shared by both the President and the Senate. Such a 
reading of the Treaty Clause is confirmed by Alexander Hamilton’s 
analysis in The Federalist: 
The power in question seems therefore to form a distinct 
department, and to belong properly neither to the legislative nor to 
the executive. The qualities elsewhere detailed, as indispensable in 
the management of foreign negotiations, point out the executive as 
the most fit agent in those transactions; while the vast importance of 
the trust, and the operation of treaties as laws, plead strongly for the 
participation of the whole or a part of the legislative body in the 
office of making them.154 
By providing a role for both the executive and legislative branches in 
treaty formation, the Constitution ensures that the treaty formation process 
will be subject to checks and balances.155 Yet, that the Framers 
incorporated a senatorial consent requirement into the procedure for 
assuming international commitments implies that they also thought such a 
check should exist during the termination of such commitments.156 In this 
way, the constitutional text suggests that Congress, or at least the Senate, 
should have some role in actions which can terminate international 
obligations assumed through the treaty-making process.  
This textual argument for having a senatorial role in unsigning faces a 
major critique. As the court of appeals noted in Goldwater: 
The constitutional institution of advice and consent of the Senate, 
provided two-thirds of the Senators concur, is a special and 
extraordinary condition of the exercise by the President of certain 
specified powers under Article II. It is not lightly to be extended in 
instances not set forth in the Constitution. Such an extension by 
implication is not proper unless that implication is unmistakably 
clear.157 
 
 
 153. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 154. THE FEDERALIST NO. 75, at 505 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (emphasis 
added). 
 155. See Goldwater v. Carter, 481 F. Supp. 949, 963 (D.D.C. 1979) (“This constitutional 
requirement [of consent of two-thirds of the Senate] reflects the concern of the Founding Fathers that 
neither political branch possess unchecked power.”). 
 156. Id. See also ADLER, supra note 11, at 84–113.  
 157. Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697, 704 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss7/9
p 1941 Mclaurin book pages.doc 10/31/2007  
 
 
 
 
 
2006] CAN THE PRESIDENT “UNSIGN” A TREATY? 1963 
 
 
 
 
This criticism, however, seems to read the constitutional text too 
narrowly. The court of appeals ignores the fact that the constitutional 
language makes treaty-making a shared power.158 Also, the court fails to 
explain how an implication from the constitutional text could be made 
“unmistakably clear.” An implication, by definition, is an inference that is 
not clear precisely because it is not explicitly stated.159 Indeed, under the 
court’s analysis, the President should not be granted the exclusive right to 
unsign treaties since the Constitution does not “unmistakably” give him 
that power.  
2. Framers’ Intent Arguments 
As the above discussion illustrates, the constitutional text is open to 
different interpretations regarding who should be able to unsign treaties. 
While the text itself may be inconclusive, the writings of the Framers 
provide important insights into the concerns that the Treaty Clause was 
meant to address. The Supreme Court has often given the writings of the 
Framers great weight in interpreting the Constitution. For example, in 
Ogden v. Saunders,160 the Court stated: “[T]he cotemporaries [sic] of the 
constitution have claims to our deference . . . because they had the best 
opportunities of informing themselves of the understanding of the framers 
of the constitution, and of the sense put upon it by the people when it was 
adopted by them.”161  
While the Framers probably never contemplated the unsigning of a 
treaty,162 their writings illustrate whether unilateral presidential unsigning 
is consistent with the constitutional design. 
Before considering the Framers’ commentary on the Constitution, a 
brief discussion of the drafting history of the Treaty Clause is 
appropriate.163 The initial outline of the Constitution, the Virginia Plan, 
did not mention the treaty power.164 The first version of the treaty power 
 
 
 158. See supra text accompanying notes 151–52. 
 159. See 7 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 723 (2d ed. 1989). 
 160. 25 U.S. 213 (1827). 
 161. Id. at 290. See also Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 547 (1969) (“The relevancy of 
prior exclusion cases is limited largely to the insight they afford in correctly ascertaining the 
draftsmen's intent. Obviously, therefore, the precedential value of these cases tends to increase in 
proportion to their proximity to the Convention in 1787.”). 
 162. Many international law scholars never even considered the possibility of unsigning until 
President Bush announced that he would unsign the Rome Statute. See supra notes 7–9.  
 163. For a more complete examination of the drafting of the treaty clause, see ADLER, supra note 
11, at 85–88; Bestor, supra note 11, at 73–132; Sabis, supra note 11, at 245–46; see also THE 
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 (Max Farrand ed., 1966).  
 164. See 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 163, at 20–23. 
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appeared in the Committee on Detail’s August 6, 1787, draft, which stated 
that “[t]he Senate of the United States shall have power to make treaties, 
and to appoint Ambassadors, and Judges of the supreme Court.”165 This 
proposal to give the Senate control over treaty-making was rather 
controversial.166 In particular, some delegates felt that the treaty power 
should be an executive function.167 Thus, on August 20, 1787, the 
Committee of the Whole, while not taking the treaty power away from the 
Senate, recommended that the “Secretary of foreign affairs who shall also 
be appointed by the President” would have the “duty to correspond with 
all foreign Ministers, prepare plans of Treaties, and consider such as may 
be transmitted from abroad.”168 This compromise, however, was not 
acceptable to the Convention.169 Finally, on September 4, 1787, the 
Committee of Eleven presented a draft which moved the treaty power to 
Article II and provided that “[t]he President, by and with the advice and 
consent of the Senate, shall have power to make treaties . . . But no Treaty 
(except Treaties of Peace) shall be made without the consent of two thirds 
of the Members present.”170 This compromise was deemed acceptable to 
the Convention delegates because it appropriately divided the treaty power 
among the executive and legislative branches.171 With some modifications, 
this proposal became the final text of the Treaty Clause. 
This drafting history indicates that the Framers did not want the treaty 
power to be either exclusively executive or exclusively legislative. On the 
contrary, the Framers sought to divide the power between the two 
branches. This intent to create checks and balances in the treaty power 
derived from several motivations.172 Professor Adler notes that one of the 
Framers’ primary motives in drafting the Treaty Clause was “to end the 
pervasive infidelity which the nation had shown to international 
obligations and treaty agreements under the Articles of Confederation.”173 
 
 
 165. See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 163, at 183. 
 166. See ADLER, supra note 11, at 86–87. 
 167. Id. 
 168. See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 163, at 336. 
 169. See Sabis, supra note 11, at 246. 
 170. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 163, at 495. 
 171. Consider, for example, the comments of Pennsylvania delegate James Wilson who stated: 
“Neither the President nor the Senate, solely can complete a treaty; they are checks upon each other, 
and are so balanced as to produce security to the people.” See ADLER, supra note 11, at 89–90.  
 172. For discussions of the intentions of the Framers when drafting the treaty clause, see ADLER, 
supra note 11, at 85–111; Bestor, supra note 11, at 46–72. 
 173. ADLER, supra note 11, at 85. John Jay’s comments in The Federalist also indicate that the 
Framers wanted to ensure that the new nation would approach treaties with the seriousness they 
deserved: 
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To ensure that the nation would properly respect its treaty commitments, 
the Framers required a system which would prevent the nation from 
assuming such obligations lightly.174 Additionally, the Framers were 
concerned that some treaty commitments might have a disparate effect on 
the various states.175 Thus, they also sought to vest the treaty power in an 
authority that would not be swayed by sectarian interests.176 For these 
reasons, the Framers decided to make the conclusion of treaties possible 
only by the concurrence of the President and the Senate.177 This 
combination of executive and legislative roles ensured that the treaty 
power would be exercised with the utmost care.178  
 
 
 The power of making treaties is an important one, especially as it relates to war, peace, 
and commerce; and it should not be delegated but in such a mode, and with such precautions, 
as will afford the highest security that it will be exercised by men the best qualified for the 
purpose, and in the manner most conducive to the public good. . . .  
 . . . . 
 Others, though content that treaties should be made in the mode proposed, are averse to 
their being the supreme laws of the land. They insist and profess to believe, that treaties, like 
acts of assembly, should be repealable at pleasure. This idea seems to be new and peculiar to 
this country, but new errors as well as new truths, often appear. These gentlemen would do 
well to reflect that a treaty is only another name for a bargain; and that it would be impossible 
to find a nation who would make any bargain with us, which should be binding on them 
absolutely, but on us only so long and so far as we may think proper to be bound by it. They 
who make laws may without doubt amend or repeal them, and it will not be disputed that they 
who make treaties may alter or cancel them; but still let us not forget that treaties are made 
not by only one of the contracting parties, but by both, and consequently that as the consent of 
both was essential to their formation at first, so must it ever afterwards be to alter or cancel 
them. The proposed Constitution therefore has not in the least extended the obligation of 
treaties. They are just as binding, and just as far beyond the lawful reach of legislative acts 
now, as they will be at any future period, or under any form of government. 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 64, at 432–37 (John Jay) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
 174. See HENKIN, supra note 11, at 175. 
 175. See ADLER, supra note 11, at 85–86. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. at 87.  
 178. Alexander Hamilton’s comments in The Federalist No. 75 illuminate the issues faced by the 
Framers in vesting the treaty power. He wrote: 
 To have entrusted the power of making treaties to the senate alone, would have been to 
relinquish the benefits of the constitutional agency of the president, in the conduct of foreign 
negotiations. It is true, that the senate would in that case have the option of employing him in 
this capacity; but they would also have the option of letting it alone; and pique or cabal might 
induce the latter rather than the former. Besides this, the ministerial servant of the senate 
could not be expected to enjoy the confidence and respect of foreign powers in the same 
degree with the constitutional representatives of the nation; and of course would not be able 
to act with an equal degree of weight or efficacy. While the union would from this cause lose 
a considerable advantage in the management of its external concerns, the people would lose 
the additional security, which would result from the co-operation of the executive. Though it 
would be imprudent to confide in him solely so important a trust; yet it cannot be doubted, 
that his participation in it would materially add to the safety of the society. It must indeed be 
clear to a demonstration, that the joint possession of the power in question by the president 
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The Framers’ deliberations about where to vest the treaty power 
suggest that they would have opposed any proposal to give one branch of 
government exclusive authority to unsign treaties. Because of their 
concern with the United States’ record for breaching treaties, the Framers 
probably would not have wanted the President to terminate treaties 
unilaterally. On the contrary, many of the Framers indicated that the 
termination of treaties should involve at least the Senate and the 
President.179 For example, Alexander Hamilton stated: 
The history of human conduct does not warrant that exalted opinion 
of human virtue which would make it wise in a nation to commit 
interests of so delicate and momentous a kind as those which 
concern its intercourse with the rest of the world to the sole disposal 
of a magistrate, created and circumstanced, as would be a president 
of the United States.180 
Years later, Justice Story, reflecting upon the Framers’ constitutional 
design, also remarked: 
[I]t is too much to expect, that a free people would confide to a 
single magistrate, however respectable, the sole authority to act 
conclusively, as well as exclusively, upon the subject of treaties. . . . 
[T]here is no American statesman, but must feel, that such a 
prerogative in an American president would be inexpedient and 
dangerous.181 
Likewise, Professor Bestor’s historical analysis of the Constitutional 
Convention led him to conclude that “[t]here is no historical evidence 
whatever to suggest that [the Framers] intended the correlative power to 
terminate treaties to be other than a shared power. And a shared power is, 
by definition, a power that cannot be exercised by one of the partners 
without the concurrence of the other.”182  
 
 
and senate would afford a greater prospect of security, than the separate possession of it by 
either of them. And whoever has maturely weighed the circumstances, which must concur in 
the appointment of a president will be satisfied, that the office will always bid fair to be filled 
by men of such characters as to render their concurrence in the formation of treaties 
peculiarly desirable, as well on the score of wisdom as on that of integrity. 
THE FEDERALIST No. 75, at 506 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
 179. See ADLER, supra note 11, at 105–11. 
 180. THE FEDERALIST No. 75, at 505–06 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
 181. 2 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION 341 (4th ed. 1873), quoted in ADLER, 
supra note 11, at 123 n.43. 
 182. Bestor, supra note 11, at 30. 
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These concerns about unilateral treaty termination apply with the same 
force to unilateral unsigning. Under international law, unsigning a treaty 
amounts to a repudiation of the state’s obligation to abide by the object 
and purpose of the treaty.183 Yet, if it is dangerous to permit one branch to 
terminate American treaty commitments, then, arguably, it is also 
dangerous to let one branch terminate the United States’ commitments not 
to act against the object and purpose of a treaty.  
Furthermore, the argument goes, unilateral unsigning would not 
encourage Presidents to approach treaty commitments with the seriousness 
that they deserve. Armed with the power to unilaterally unsign treaties, a 
President who did not like the terms of a treaty that his predecessor had 
signed could simply unsign it. Rather than representing the United States’ 
commitment to certain international goals, a treaty signature would simply 
be the expression of current American foreign policy, which could change 
with the next election. In such a system, other countries could not reliably 
view an American treaty signature as engaging international responsibility. 
Because the Framers’ goal in drafting the Treaty Clause was to ensure that 
the United States did not enter its treaty commitments lightly, unilateral 
presidential unsigning should be especially discouraged. 
B. Structual Arguments 
In addition to examining both the text of the Treaty Clause and the 
Framers’ understandings of that text, one can also look to other provisions 
of the Constitution as well as the Constitution’s general structure to 
understand the treaty power. In particular, the Appointments Clause184 and 
the Supremacy Clause185 provide insight into the presidential and 
congressional exercise of the treaty power. Separation of powers principles 
and the “sole organ” doctrine186 also offer compelling ways in which to 
understand unsigning. This Part considers each of these arguments in turn.  
 
 
 183. See supra text accompanying notes 32–39. 
 184. The President “shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall 
appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other 
Officers of the United States.” U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.  
 185. The “Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance 
thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall 
be the supreme Law of the Land.” U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2.  
 186. The “sole organ” doctrine is the notion that the President is the sole representative of the 
United States in foreign affairs. See infra Part IV.B.2.a. 
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1. Analogy to Other Constitutional Provisions 
a. The Appointments Clause 
Presidential authority to unsign treaties may be implicitly included in 
the Appointments Clause.187 The Supreme Court has found that the 
ambassador-receiving power, which appears in the same paragraph as the 
treaty power,188 entails the power to recognize foreign governments and to 
establish relations with them.189 These powers further include the ability to 
remove obstacles to the recognition of foreign states.190 President Carter 
argued that this power to recognize foreign governments also included the 
power to terminate any treaties which would be inconsistent with such 
recognition.191 In particular, the Carter administration claimed that as part 
of normalizing American relations with the Peoples’ Republic of China, 
the President needed to unilaterally terminate the Mutual Defense Treaty 
with Taiwan, which claimed to be the sole legitimate Chinese 
government.192 While a majority of the Supreme Court refused to rule on 
the merits of such an argument, the D.C. Court of Appeals193 and Justice 
Brennan (in dissent) found that the recognition power justified unilateral 
presidential termination of the Mutual Defense Treaty.194  
Similarly, the recognition power could be used to justify unilateral 
presidential unsigning. For example, even if the United States had not yet 
ratified the Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan, President Carter might 
have found it necessary to unsign that treaty as part of its recognition of 
the Peoples’ Republic of China as the sole legitimate Chinese government. 
While treaties are not binding until ratified, the mere fact that the United 
States has negotiated and signed an agreement with the government of 
another country indicates that the United States views that negotiating 
partner as the legitimate government of that nation. Unsigning such 
treaties would thus be an important part of recognizing new governments. 
 
 
 187. See Scott, supra note 13, at 1460. 
 188. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 189. Scott, supra note 13, at 1460. See also Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 
410 (1964) (“Political recognition is exclusively a function of the Executive.”). 
 190. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 229 (1942). 
 191. Goldwater v. Carter, 481 F. Supp. 949, 961 (D.D.C. 1979). 
 192. Id. See also KRAFT, supra note 116, at 71–72.  
 193. Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697, 707–08 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
 194. Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1007 (1979) (“Abrogation of the defense treaty with 
Taiwan was a necessary incident to Executive recognition of the Peking Government, because the 
defense treaty was predicated upon the now-abandoned view that the Taiwan Government was the 
only legitimate political authority in China. Our cases firmly establish that the Constitution commits to 
the President alone the power to recognize, and withdraw recognition from, foreign regimes.”).  
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Because the President has the exclusive competence to recognize foreign 
governments, it follows that he must have the authority to unsign treaties 
that would be inconsistent with the exercise of this recognition power.  
This argument, however, cannot justify unilateral presidential 
unsigning of all treaties. Indeed, when President Bush unsigned the Rome 
Statute, he did not claim to be acting pursuant to his recognition power.195 
Rather, his decision to unsign that treaty resulted from his own political 
conviction that subjecting Americans to the jurisdiction of the ICC would 
not be in the country’s best interests.196 Future cases of unsigning will 
probably also result from such policy considerations rather than from the 
need to recognize new governments.  
While the Appointments Clause may not directly grant the President 
the power to unilaterally unsign treaties, it can inform one’s reading of the 
treaty power. As Scott has observed, “The Framers’ decision to include the 
Treaty Clause and the Appointments Clause together in the same 
paragraph, sharing very similar language, supports their common 
interpretation.”197 The Appointments Clause states: 
[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and 
Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public 
Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other 
Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein 
otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law.198 
Like the Treaty Clause, the Appointments Clause indicates that the 
President must exercise the appointments power in conjunction with the 
Senate. Also, analogous to the Treaty Clause’s textual silence about 
termination, the Appointments Clause is also silent about the President’s 
power to remove persons appointed under the clause. While other parts of 
the Constitution provide that some officials, such as federal judges, may 
only be removed for certain reasons,199 the Supreme Court has found that 
the President has the exclusive power to remove executive officers 
exercising solely executive functions.200  
Under this reasoning, it could be argued that if the president has 
unilateral removal power with respect to some officials appointed under 
 
 
 195. See supra notes 2–6. 
 196. Id. 
 197. See Scott, supra note 13, at 1461. 
 198. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 199. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.  
 200. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 723 (1986); Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 
U.S. 602 (1935); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 64 (1926). 
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the Appointments Clause, then he should also have power to unilaterally 
terminate some treaty obligations. While President Carter advanced such a 
claim, it does not necessarily follow from the Supreme Court’s 
Appointments Clause rulings.201 As the D.C. District Court observed: 
The power to remove executive personnel cannot be compared with 
the power to terminate an important international treaty. The 
removal power is restricted in its exercise to “purely executive 
officers” charged with a duty unrelated to the legislative or judicial 
power. It concerns the President’s administrative control over his 
subordinates and flows from the President’s obligations to see that 
the laws are faithfully executed. By contrast, treaty termination 
impacts upon the substantial role of Congress in foreign affairs—
especially in the context of a mutual defense pact involving the 
potential exercise of congressional war powers—and is a 
contradiction rather than a corollary of the Executive’s enforcement 
obligation.202 
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Appointments 
Clause as permitting unilateral presidential removal of executive officials 
does suggest that even though the Senate may have a constitutionally 
assigned role in treaty formation, it does not necessarily have a role in 
treaty termination. Thus, presidential power to unilaterally terminate, or 
unsign, a treaty would be consistent with the linguistic structure of the 
Treaty Clause. 
Additionally, Scott has argued that the President’s power to withdraw 
names submitted to the Senate for consideration under the Appointments 
Clause offers a further justification for the President’s ability to 
unilaterally unsign treaties.203 The President consistently exercises his 
power to withdraw nominations from the Senate.204 However, “[b]ecause 
the withdrawal under the appointment power seems closely analogous to 
the withdrawal under the treaty power, the fact that the President can 
withdraw nominations at will supports the conclusion that he can also 
unilaterally withdraw treaties.”205 By withdrawing treaties from the 
Senate, the President ensures that their provisions will never become 
 
 
 201. See Goldwater v. Carter, 481 F. Supp. 949, 960 (D.D.C. 1979).  
 202. Id. 
 203. Scott, supra note 13, at 1462. 
 204. Id. See also Court in Transition: Text of Harriet Miers’s Letter to President Withdrawing as 
Nominee, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2005, at A16.  
 205. Scott, supra note 13, at 1462–63. 
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binding on the United States. Unilateral presidential unsigning of treaties 
would accomplish the same result. 
b. The Supremacy Clause 
While reading the Treaty Clause in light of the Appointments Clause 
suggests that unilateral presidential unsigning is constitutional, a careful 
analysis of the Supremacy Clause might lead to the opposite conclusion. 
This clause provides that the Constitution, congressionally enacted laws, 
and “all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the 
United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land.”206 While the 
Constitution explicitly provides a procedure for amending its own text,207 
it is silent about how laws and treaties should be amended or 
terminated.208 Despite this silence, Congress has, without question, 
exercised the authority to repeal laws by following the same procedure 
required for making those laws.209 By analogy, treaty termination should 
be effected by the same branches of government that create treaties. 
Indeed, as noted above, the Framers simply assumed that this was how 
treaty termination would occur.210  
Furthermore, the structure of the Supremacy Clause indicates that 
treaties occupy the same position as statutes in the laws of the United 
States. Treaties and statutes being equal, the Supreme Court has held that 
the provisions of treaties may be effectively repealed by a statute which 
supersedes the treaty.211 However, if Congress has the power to pass such 
a statute, then it should also be permitted to participate in treaty 
termination. Thus, at minimum, the operation of the Supremacy Clause 
provides for some congressional role in treaty termination. 
These arguments for a congressional role in treaty termination can also 
apply to the unsigning of treaties. While a treaty does not become the law 
of the land until it has been ratified, treaty signature does bind the United 
States to refrain from acting in a way that would render later ratification 
meaningless.212 Because this obligation applies to all branches of the 
government in the same way that eventual treaty obligations do, under the 
 
 
 206. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2. 
 207. U.S. CONST. art V. 
 208. See Bestor, supra note 11, at 17–18. 
 209. Id.  
 210. See ADLER, supra note 11, at 105–10. See generally Bestor, supra note 11. 
 211. See supra note 107.  
 212. See supra text accompanying note 39. 
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above rationale, Congress should also have a role in reversing treaty 
signature.  
2. Structural Theory Arguments 
a. The “Sole Organ” Doctrine 
The placement of the treaty power within Article II potentially suggests 
that the President has the power to unilaterally unsign treaties.213 The 
Constitution articulates the limited powers of Congress very differently 
than the way in which it presents the expansive powers of the President. 
Unlike Article I, which vests in Congress only those legislative powers 
“herein granted,”214 Article II states that “[t]he executive power shall be 
vested in a President of the United States.”215 This linguistic difference 
indicates that the President’s executive power is not limited by the 
enumeration of his powers in Article II.216 Rather, the President possesses 
all of the executive powers of the United States, except where the 
Constitution indicates otherwise.217 Because one of the key powers of the 
executive is control over foreign affairs, the President has exclusive 
competence to direct foreign relations.218 Indeed, the Supreme Court has 
stated that “the President alone has the power to speak or listen as a 
representative of the nation.”219 Furthermore, “as the sole organ of the 
federal government in the field of international relations,” the President 
has a “plenary and exclusive power” over foreign affairs.220  
Unsigning is one way in which the President can exercise this plenary 
power. By unsigning treaties, the President expresses American 
unwillingness to commit to particular ideas or accept certain international 
legal norms as binding on the United States. For example, by unsigning 
the Rome Statute, President Bush communicated America’s desire not to 
be subject to the jurisdiction of the ICC.221 Unsigning treaties could also 
enable the President to maintain more direct control over American 
 
 
 213. See HAROLD J. KRENT, PRESIDENTIAL POWERS 106 (2005); JOHN YOO, THE POWERS OF WAR 
AND PEACE 18 (2005). 
 214. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1, cl. 1. 
 215. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1. 
 216. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 705 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (The language of 
Article II “does not mean some of the executive power, but all of the executive power.”). 
 217. See YOO, supra note 213. 
 218. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936).  
 219. Id. 
 220. Id. at 320. 
 221. See Letter to U.N., supra note 6. 
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relations with particular countries. For instance, while the President might 
negotiate a friendship treaty with a foreign state as a symbol of American 
commitment to cooperation with that state, future events could require the 
President to modify the tone of American relations with that state. If the 
friendship treaty has not yet been ratified, then unsigning the treaty might 
be an effective way to accomplish that goal.  
Incident to his exclusive power over foreign affairs, “the President 
[also] has the power as Chief Executive under many circumstances to 
exercise functions regarding treaties which have the effect of either 
terminating or continuing their vitality.”222 However, if the President can 
unilaterally terminate a treaty under his foreign affairs power, then 
logically he could also unilaterally unsign a treaty.223 Indeed, by unsigning 
a treaty, the President escapes the commitment to act in a manner that is 
consistent with the object and purpose of the treaty.  
b. Separation of Powers 
While unsigning might be consistent with the President’s control over 
foreign affairs, separation of powers principles counsel against granting 
the President the power to unilaterally unsign treaties. The doctrine of 
“[s]eparation of powers was designed to implement a fundamental insight: 
Concentration of power in the hands of a single branch is a threat to 
liberty.”224 The inclusion of the Senate in treaty formation provides an 
important check on the executive’s power to bind the nation.225 The 
President cannot unilaterally commit the United States to international 
agreements to which the American people, through their representatives in 
the Senate, do not consent. Indeed, placing the power over treaties in one 
branch alone would open the nation to serious dangers.226 Likewise, 
entrusting just one branch with the power to terminate American 
international obligations would also be reckless. Unsigning, however, does 
involve the termination of an interim obligation not to act against the 
object and purpose of a treaty. Thus, under separation of powers 
principles, no single branch should exercise this power alone. 
 
 
 222. Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697, 706 (D.C. Cir. 1979).  
 223. See Scott, supra note 13, at 1463 (“[T]he President appears to have the constitutional 
authority to terminate ratified treaties unilaterally. Because such an act nullifies the Senate’s grant of 
consent, it follows that he can unilaterally end Senate consideration of a signed treaty that has not yet 
received consent.”).  
 224. Clinton v. New York, 524 U.S. 417, 450 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 225. See supra note 173. 
 226. See supra text accompanying notes 176–78. 
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While not directly addressing the issue of unsigning, Justice Jackson’s 
view of presidential power in his concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & 
Tube Co. v. Sawyer227 also suggests that presidential unsigning of treaties 
would be best accomplished with congressional cooperation. Justice 
Jackson observed that “[w]hen the President acts pursuant to an express or 
implied authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it 
includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can 
delegate.”228 However, “[w]hen the President acts in absence of either a 
congressional grant or denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own 
independent powers. . . .”229 Implicit in this analysis is the belief that 
governmental decisions carry more weight when they are made by more 
than one branch.230 Thus, unless the Constitution clearly grants one branch 
the power to make certain decisions, important political decisions 
affecting the nation as a whole are best made by both legislative and 
executive action.231  
The decision to unsign a treaty is one of these important political 
decisions that should be made by both Congress and the President. Like 
treaty termination, unsigning can have important effects upon America’s 
international obligations. Moreover, unsigning a treaty is an especially 
powerful way to communicate the United States’ rejection of a particular 
international legal norm or policy. To entrust this power to only one 
branch would certainly invoke all the dangers that the Framers feared.  
  c. Policy Arguments 
Beyond the textual and structural arguments regarding unsigning, both 
proponents and opponents of unilateral presidential unsigning can advance 
compelling policy arguments. On one hand, domestic foreign policy 
concerns suggest that the President should have the exclusive authority to 
unsign treaties. On the other hand, the international legal consequences of 
unsigning urge congressional involvement in the process.  
In dealing with other countries, the United States requires a unified and 
coherent foreign policy. One of the chief concerns of the Framers in 
replacing the Articles of Confederation with the Constitution was to create 
a federal government that would have the ability to speak for the nation 
 
 
 227. 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
 228. Id. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 229. Id. at 637. 
 230. Miller, supra note 11, at 886. 
 231. See id. 
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with one voice.232 In the system they created, the executive provides this 
voice in the international arena.233 The Framers endowed the presidential 
office with many practical advantages for conducting foreign affairs.234 
For this reason, the Supreme Court has stated: 
In this vast external realm, with its important, complicated, delicate 
and manifold problems, the President alone has the power to speak 
or listen as a representative of the nation. . . .  
 . . . [H]e, not Congress, has the better opportunity of knowing 
the conditions which prevail in foreign countries, and especially is 
this true in time of war. He has his confidential sources of 
information. He has his agents in the form of diplomatic, consular 
and other officials.235 
Not only is the President well-suited for foreign affairs, he has also 
historically exercised exclusive control over this field.236 Other countries 
clearly view the President as representing the United States in 
international affairs.  
Unsigning treaties could be said to fall within these foreign relations 
duties because it can have important consequences for American foreign 
policy.237 By withdrawing from commitments, the United States expresses 
its disapproval of certain emerging norms in international law or of 
particular approaches to solving international problems.238 An American 
failure to support particular international norms or transnational 
 
 
 232. See ADLER, supra note 11, at 85. 
 233. See YOO, supra note 213, at 20. 
 234. Scott, supra note 13, at 1466. These advantages serve the President particularly well in 
making treaties. As John Jay observed: 
 It seldom happens in the negociation of treaties of whatever nature, but that perfect 
secrecy and immediate dispatch are sometimes requisite. There are cases where the most 
useful intelligence may be obtained, if the persons possessing it can be relieved from 
apprehensions of discovery. Those apprehensions will operate on those persons whether they 
are actuated by mercenary or friendly motives, and there doubtless are many of both 
descriptions, who would rely on the secrecy of the president, but who would not confide in 
that of the senate, and still less in that of a large popular assembly. The convention have done 
well therefore in so disposing of the power of making treaties, that although the president 
must in forming them act by the advice and consent of the senate, yet he will be able to 
manage the business of intelligence in such manner as prudence may suggest. 
THE FEDERALIST No. 64, at 434–35 (John Jay) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
 235. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319–20 (1936) (citations omitted). 
 236. See YOO, supra note 213, at 20. 
 237. See Rachel Brewster, The Domestic Origins of International Agreements, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 
501, 511–19 (2004); Laurence R. Helfer, Exiting Treaties, 91 VA. L. REV. 1579, 1588–92 (2005). 
 238. See Helfer, supra note 237, at 1588.  
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approaches to world problems might render further negotiations within the 
international community more difficult and time-consuming.239 Thus, the 
choice to communicate American withdrawal from international 
commitments must be balanced against other American foreign policy 
goals and the need to garner international support for American projects 
and ideas. Such a balance is arguably best accomplished by the President, 
who already has the obligation of coordinating American foreign policy.  
At the same time, unilateral presidential unsigning of treaties is 
repugnant to the democratic principles of American government. The 
senatorial advice and consent provided for in the Treaty Clause ensure that 
treaty formation is ultimately guided by the democratic political process. 
Indeed, the Framers envisioned that the people, through their senators, 
would have some control over treaty-making.240 Alexander Hamilton 
found that “the vast importance of the trust, and the operation of treaties as 
laws, plead strongly for the participation of the whole or a part of the 
legislative body in the office of making them.”241 Granting the President 
the power to unsign treaties unilaterally would remove an element of this 
democratic control.  
Unsigning a treaty can also have important political consequences for 
the nation as a whole. As Professor Helfer has observed: 
[M]ultiple refusals to ratify [treaties]—as with multiple 
denunciations of previously ratified agreements—signal a state’s 
propensity to eschew multilateral cooperation and carry much the 
same reputational cost as a track record of violating treaty 
commitments. This effect is likely to be especially pronounced 
where the non-ratifying or exiting state participated in the 
negotiating conferences that helped to shape the treaties’ form and 
substance. 
 The unilateralist behavior of the United States provides a salient 
example. The United States has recently refrained from ratifying—
or has withdrawn from—numerous multilateral agreements that are 
widely ratified by other nations and that it at one time 
championed. . . . By remaining outside these treaties through non-
 
 
 239. See id. at 1623. 
 240. See THE FEDERALIST No. 75, at 505 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).  
 241. Id.  
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entry or exit, the United States has, according to many observers, 
cast doubt on its commitment to multilateral cooperation.242 
While the President is ultimately responsible for American foreign 
policy, national discussion about international obligations is one of the 
hallmarks of democratic society. Indeed, one of the main purposes of 
granting senators a role in treaty-making is to profit from the wisdom and 
reflection that they bring to discussions about international matters.243 
Unilateral presidential unsigning would not allow this wisdom to fully 
affect American decisions to withdraw from international projects.  
Furthermore, placing the power to unsign treaties in the hands of the 
President alone would unnecessarily expand presidential power. The 
President already dominates American foreign policy and in many respects 
determines our relations with other nations. The one unambiguous check 
that the Framers placed upon the President’s control over foreign affairs 
was the senatorial role in the treaty-making process. Permitting the 
President to dominate the unsigning process would go a long way toward 
eroding this limitation on presidential power over foreign affairs. As 
Justice Frankfurter so aptly warned, “The accretion of dangerous power 
does not come in a day. It does come, however slowly, from the generative 
force of unchecked disregard of the restrictions that fence in even the most 
disinterested assertion of authority.”244 
 
 
 242. Helfer, supra note 237, at 1623–24. 
 243. Consider James Madison’s comments in The Federalist: 
 A fifth desideratum illustrating the utility of a Senate is the want of a due sense of 
national character. Without a select and stable member of the government, the esteem of 
foreign powers will not only be forfeited by an unenlightened and variable policy, proceeding 
from the causes already mentioned; but the national councils will not possess that sensibility 
to the opinion of the world, which is perhaps not less necessary in order to merit, than it is to 
obtain, its respect and confidence.  
 An attention to the judgment of other nations is important to every government for two 
reasons: The one is, that independently of the merits of any particular plan or measure, it is 
desireable on various accounts, that it should appear to other nations as the offspring of a wise 
and honorable policy: The second is, that in doubtful cases, particularly where the national 
councils may be warped by some strong passion, or momentary interest, the presumed or 
known opinion of the impartial world, may be the best guide that can be followed. What has 
not America lost by her want of character with foreign nations? And how many errors and 
follies would she not have avoided, if the justice and propriety of her measures had in every 
instance been previously tried by the light in which they would probably appear to the 
unbiassed part of mankind? 
THE FEDERALIST No. 63, at 422–23 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).  
 244. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 594 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring). 
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To give the President unilateral control over unsigning treaties would 
erode the few constitutional protections that the Framers left to future 
generations. 
V. EVALUATION OF THE ARGUMENTS—SHOULD THE PRESIDENT REALLY 
BE ABLE TO UNILATERALLY UNSIGN TREATIES? 
Having considered the potential arguments in the debate, it is now 
possible to answer the question of whether unilateral presidential 
unsigning is constitutional. Thus, this Part evaluates the various types of 
arguments presented in Part IV and concludes that the Constitution 
requires the President to obtain congressional authorization—or at least 
congressional acquiescence—in order to unsign a treaty. Before assessing 
these constitutional arguments, however, this Part will consider the context 
in which the question arises in order to identify the relevant criteria for 
such an analysis.  
While the question of the President’s constitutional power to 
unilaterally unsign treaties certainly involves legal considerations, it also 
arises within a political context that judges have previously refused to 
enter.245 Like the issue of unilateral presidential treaty termination, the 
issue of unilateral presidential unsigning is “a dispute between coequal 
branches of our Government, each of which has resources available to 
protect and assert its interests.”246 Indeed, even more than the issue of 
treaty termination, which was at least contemplated by the Framers, courts 
would probably consider the issue of unsigning not to be susceptible to 
resolution by judicially manageable standards.247 Unsigning is a relatively 
new phenomenon in both international and domestic law.248 International 
legal scholars are still trying to understand the legal effects of 
unsigning.249 Although federal courts could analyze the constitutional 
dimension of the question,250 the Supreme Court is not likely to “decide 
issues affecting the allocation of power between the President and 
Congress until the political branches reach a constitutional impasse.”251 
Thus, even though important constitutional issues are involved, federal 
courts will probably not resolve the “political question” of the 
 
 
 245. See Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979). 
 246. Id. at 1004 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). 
 247. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211–12 (1962). 
 248. See supra text accompanying notes 1–10. 
 249. See supra note 8. 
 250. See supra Part IV. 
 251. Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 997 (Powell, J., concurring). 
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constitutionality of unilateral presidential unsigning. Rather, the resolution 
of this constitutional question will most likely occur in the course of the 
“normal political process.”252 
Because the courts will probably not address this issue of unilateral 
presidential unsigning, the standard judicial techniques for evaluating 
constitutional arguments are not the only tools to be used in evaluating the 
arguments advanced in the debate.253 An evaluation of the potential 
arguments must also consider the political concerns raised by unsigning. 
Viewed from a political perspective, the real issue in the debate is which 
branch should have control over the unsigning process. Having control 
over the decision to unsign treaties would enable one branch to set the tone 
for American involvement in international projects and would thus 
increase that branch’s power.254  
Although arguments based on traditional judicial criteria, such as the 
original intent of the Framers, will still be strongly persuasive in 
determining the constitutionality of unsigning,255 such arguments will 
probably not be decisive. In a constitutional dispute resolved by the 
political branches, the determination of which branch should have control 
over unsigning will likely turn upon practical policy considerations.256 In 
light of this fact, this Note proposes that the evaluation of the potential 
arguments regarding unilateral presidential unsigning should focus on two 
questions: (1) Is unilateral presidential unsigning consistent with the 
constitutional design of the Framers? (2) Is unilateral presidential 
unsigning wise in light of the international legal consequences of 
unsigning? Rather than concentrating on a technical linguistic 
interpretation of the Constitution, these two questions consider which 
approach to unsigning best serves constitutional design and contemporary 
realities, respectively. The rest of this Part will evaluate the arguments 
presented in Part IV in light of these two questions. 
While direct textual arguments regarding unsigning are inconclusive,257 
the arguments based on the Framers’ intent258 demonstrate that granting 
 
 
 252. Id. 
 253. See Spiro, supra note 69, at 961. 
 254. See Brewster, supra note 237, at 502 (noting that one of the most interesting aspects of 
international agreements is their ability to “entrench policies that might otherwise be subject to change 
[and to] transfer agenda-setting power from the Congress to the President”).  
 255. Arguments based on the constitutional text as well as historical practice will certainly offer 
legal support for a branch’s claim to have a role in unsigning.  
 256. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
concurring). 
 257. See supra Part IV.A.1. 
 258. See supra Part IV.A.2. 
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the President exclusive control over unsigning would be inconsistent with 
the constitutional design. These arguments are particularly persuasive 
because they highlight the Framers’ fear of concentrating the treaty power 
in just one branch of government.259 Even though unilateral presidential 
unsigning was not directly a concern of the Framers, their desire to ensure 
that the United States would respect its treaty commitments would surely 
have led them to provide for a congressional role in unsigning.260 The 
structural arguments that support unilateral presidential unsigning do not 
rebut this conclusion.  
Despite Scott’s attempts to analogize the treaty power to the 
appointments power,261 a closer examination of both of these powers 
reveals that they are quite distinct. Although the constitutional language 
granting the two powers is similar in structure, the powers function 
differently in practice.262 The Appointments Clause is primarily concerned 
with the executive’s responsibility to ensure that domestic laws are 
faithfully executed.263 In such domestic matters, the President has 
complete control over the executive branch.264 The Treaty Clause, in 
contrast, relates to the President’s control over foreign affairs, which is not 
absolute.265  
Even under “sole organ” theory,266 the President would still not have 
definite control over unsigning. The language of the Treaty Clause ensures 
that the President can only make treaties with the advice and consent of 
the Senate.267 Thus, while the President acts as the sole representative 
before other countries for purposes of negotiation, he does not exclusively 
represent the United States when it assumes treaty obligations. 
Withdrawing from international obligations is no less serious than 
engaging in them. Thus, if the constitutional design does not include an 
exclusive role for the President in assuming treaty obligations, then it also 
must not include an exclusive role for the President in exiting international 
obligations.  
The policy arguments considered in Part IV also demonstrate that 
excluding the Senate from participation in unsigning would be unwise as a 
 
 
 259. See supra text accompanying notes 176–79. 
 260. See id. 
 261. See Scott, supra note 13, at 1461–62. 
 262. See Goldwater v. Carter, 481 F. Supp. 949, 960 (D.D.C. 1979). 
 263. Id. 
 264. Id. 
 265. Id. 
 266. See supra Part IV.B.2.a. 
 267. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
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practical matter. Unsigning a treaty does more than just communicate a 
state’s intent to no longer be bound by the obligation not to defeat the 
object and purpose of the treaty. Unsigning is a way, both symbolic and 
real, in which a state withdraws from the process of international norm 
construction that treaties represent.268 Such withdrawals affect other states’ 
views of America and also affect the ability of the United States to find 
international support for its own initiatives.269 A process by which the 
President alone makes this decision might be efficient, but it would not 
allow for the thoughtful reflection or the multi-voice deliberations that 
characterize democratic decision-making.  
Thus, a consideration of both constitutional and contemporary policy 
indicates that unilateral presidential unsigning should be unconstitutional. 
But if the President cannot constitutionally unsign treaties alone, what 
level of congressional involvement is required? Because the Treaty Clause 
requires the consent of two-thirds of the Senate to make treaties, symmetry 
would suggest that unsigning also requires a two-thirds concurrence.270 
However, “[t]he creation of a constitutionally obligatory role in all cases 
for a two-thirds consent by the Senate would give to one-third plus one of 
the Senate the power to deny the President the authority necessary to 
conduct our foreign policy in a rational and effective manner.”271 Practical 
considerations would suggest that the Senate’s required role in unsigning 
should not include a strict two-thirds vote.  
To preserve the most flexibility for such a political decision, perhaps 
no set procedure should be established. Rather, the Senate might simply 
require the President to consult a majority of its members, at least 
informally, before beginning the unsigning process. For example, a 
supporting Senate resolution could be required as a precondition to 
presidential unsigning of a treaty. In this way, the Senate would maintain 
some control over unsigning while still allowing the President to act with a 
certain degree of flexibility. Viewed under this test, President Bush’s 
unsigning of the Rome Statue was probably constitutional since Congress, 
and more importantly the Senate, acquiesced in that decision.272 However, 
future Presidents who hope to constitutionally unsign treaties should seek 
Senate approval before acting unilaterally.  
 
 
 268. See supra text accompanying notes 51–54. 
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 270. See Scheffer, supra note 11, at 1002. 
 271. Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697, 706 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
 272. See supra note 14. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p 1941 Mclaurin book pages.doc 10/31/2007  
 
 
 
 
 
1982 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 84:1941 
 
 
 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This Note has argued that the President does not have the power to 
unilaterally unsign treaties. However, the question of whether the 
Constitution permits the President to unilaterally unsign treaties has yet to 
be resolved by either the courts or the political branches of government. 
Since the courts will probably not resolve this issue because of its political 
implications, the burden rests on Congress to ensure that it has a voice in 
unsigning treaties. Congress would be wise to heed Justice Jackson’s 
famous warning: “[C]ongressional inertia, indifference or quiescence may 
sometimes, at least as a practical matter, enable, if not invite, measures on 
independent presidential responsibility. In this area, any actual test of 
power is likely to depend on the imperatives of events and contemporary 
imponderables rather than on abstract theories of law.”273  
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 273. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
concurring). 
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